Fr. Hegel. Dr. and Professor of Philosophy in Jena, Member of the. Ducal Mineralogical Society, Assessor to the Society and. Member of other learned societies. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit () is one of the most influential Title: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The phenomenology of spirit / Georg Wilhelm. This translation of Hegel's Phdnomenologie des Geistes has been made from the fifth edi- THE Phenomenology of Spirit, firs t pu blished in , is a work.
|Language:||English, Indonesian, French|
|ePub File Size:||17.73 MB|
|PDF File Size:||10.27 MB|
|Distribution:||Free* [*Sign up for free]|
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. G. W. F. HEGEL .. C. SPIRIT IN THE CONDITION OF BEING CERTAIN OF ITSELF: MORALITY C. Spirit in the Condition of Being Certain of Itself Morality The Phenomenology of Spirit, written in by G.W. Hegel while teaching at the University of Jena. Phenomenology of Spirit emerges as the most important, but also perhaps . Hegel's Phenomenology of spirit / Ludwig Siep ; translated from the German by.
But the first thing that is needed, for anyone beginning Hegel or still less than comfortable with him, is a quick introduction, an interpretation, not necessarily the only one or the "right" one, but a philosophical handle, a way of proceeding. The reader has a right to know which Hegel he is about to meet, the great rationalist metaphysician, the Christian apologist, the theological heretic, the philosopher of "the state," the proto-radical predecessor of Marx, the super-professor of Berlin, an alienated theology student of Tubingen, the spokesman for the Absolute, or the precocious proponent of historical relativism for whom an idea is "true" only for its time.
Every introduction is already an interpretation; a meeting of minds may nevertheless be full of mutual misunderstandings. But Hegel himself admits of multiple interpretations, and some of the least interesting among them, in fact, are those he provides for us himself.
But they forget the other proposition, that it must be lived forwards. Kierkegaard, Journals Hegel wrote the Phenomenology as an introduction to a much larger philosophical "system," which begins more or less with his mammoth Science of Logic, written several years later Hegel at thirty-six, whatever his ambitions and whatever his original plans for his project, was alive with philosophy and uncertainty; he was daring and experimental rather than merely reflective, "speculative" in the best sense of that word, trying to understand a world in chaos.
This is a quite different Hegel from the senior-professor at the University of Berlin who wrote of 2. Wissenschaft der Logik; Science of Logic. First part published in Nurnberg , second part in Translated into English by W.
Johnston and L. Struthers in 2 vols. Completely revised and twice as long in and revised again in The Encyclopaedia has since been extensively edited by Rosenkranz , and Lasson , and Poggeler to include extensive additions Zusatze based on Hegel's students' lecture notes. The relationship between the Phenomenology and Hegel's later work has been a perennial source of dispute in Germany, for example, by Poggeler and Fulde; the common assumption has been that Hegel was first of all to be understood in terms of the "mature" philosopher of the "system," to which the earlier work either did or did not stand in a coherent and preparatory relationship.
Fulda's "Zur Logik der Phanomenologie," pp. Introduction philosophy as "the owl of Minerva," the great gray shadow that emerges only at twilight. Walter Kaufmann, writing of the later Hegel [after forty] asks, "Whatever happened to him? We can answer that question in a single sentence: for eight long years the poor man was headmaster of a German secondary school.
The Phenomenology is a book unto itself, and if Hegel originally considered it to be the introduction to some larger systematic project he demonstrably got carried away with it.
It was as if, to use the popular metaphor of the day, a "demon" took hold of Hegel as he was writing and inspired a work quite different from what he originally intended indeed, a work far too radical for his later more conservative philosophical sensibilities.
A Reader's Guide
And not only did Hegel become more and more absorbed in the mad progression and transformation of forms he was inventing as he drew from every facet of his experience and his wide interest in history and the classics, but he quite obviously lost sight of his future plans, at least for some time, as if to catch his breath and look around to see where he had gone only when he had finished his frenetic journey, when he finally under duress from his publisher sat down, still in a frenzy, to summarize it all in the Preface.
When Hegel later moved on, he looked back to the Phenomenology only rarely, a fact to be viewed with surprise if indeed it was the Phenomenology that set up the entire later enterprise. Consider the enormous number of self-congratulatory references in Kant's subsequent works to his ground-breaking first Critique, by way of a contrast.
Hegel refers to his book infrequently, talks about it more than modestly, and when he introduces sections in the Logic and Encyclopaedia entitled "Phenomenology," there is shockingly little reference to the Phenomenology even when he snatches entire topics and sections from it to be inserted in the later "system. For example, in the later Encyclopaedia, Part III, where the strategy of the Phenomenology is more or less repeated in the middle section called "Consciousness" in the edition which breaks down into the same three parts as the Phenomenology, "Consciousness as such, Self-Consciousness, and Reason" , but the word "phenomenology" is used only to refer loosely to consciousness as "the subject of the phenomenology of the Spirit.
The Phenomenology is not an introduction. If anything, Hegel's problem was, to borrow an apt expression from Richard Rorty: What could he possibly do after the Phenomenology as an encore? Hegel, Reason in History The single most important interpretative guideline I can offer is that the Hegel we will meet in these pages is a strict humanist. I use this term in its predominantly 19th-century context.
Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit'
Hegel is a strictly secular, virulently anti-theological, and more or less anti-Christian philosopher, not at all the Christian apologist or the theological heretic he has so often been made out to be in traditional German and English interpretations. But it is an essentially secular harmony, a sense of being "at home in the world. A particularly lively discussion of Hegel's "heresies" is still J.
The best single discussion of the "romantic" side of Hegel is M. An analysis of the Phenomenology, in terms of this romantic metaphor of "alienation and reintegration," occupies a central section of chap.
It is worth anticipating, however, that the theme of "harmony" and integration is not exclusive to Romanticism; it also defines the goal of neo-classicism and, in such works as Hyperion as well as Hegel's Phenomenology, the two movements are not always easily distinguished.
Introduction should use that word at all as nothing more than human spirit writ large, or what Hegel calls Geist. Hegel used the standard theological vocabulary even when his meaning was entirely different, for example, in his use of the language of the Trinity and "incarnation" and even the words "religion" and "Christianity.
Is it not the overriding concern with the phenomenology of spirit that stamps life with a Hegelian mark? The response to this question should come from a direct exposure to the EQYOV of thinking, which, as the phenomenology of spirit, leads the way in Hegel's life.
This is to suggest that, in opposition to romantic and historicistic views, we should see life in the light of the work. If we take up the questions that make up the very fabric of the phenomenology of spirit or of the Phenomenology of Spirit , then we gain access to a plane from which the written history of the life of Hegel his biography appears in a new light. It is from such a plane that we understand Heidegger when he asks: The independent and integral character of the work of thinking is central for Heidegger's own work and applies to the works of others as well.
In order to preserve this independent and integral character and to stress the need for taking up the work as it claims one's thinking in its immediacy, the volumes of Heidegger's Gesamtawgabe are published without an interpretive introduction and a commentary.
This is a significant point and has direct bearing on the character of the present text. When we come to a work of thinking, we should entertain no illusion as to what awaits us in reading the work. We do not come to grips with a work. Either we are prepared for confronting the task with all its demands, or we are simply not yet prepared. No interpretive introduction or commentary will change that.
We must be sincere with ourselves. More than anything else, a work of thinking calls for sincerity. Such a sincerity already knows that the labyrinthian device of an introduction cannot circumvent the actual encounter with the work of thinking.
We must face the work as it is. If we fail to do so, if we get into the work in accordance with the suggestions made in the introduction, then we run the risk of learning later that those suggestions are peripheral, external to the work, xii Translators' Foreword and inappropriate.
Thus, they will need correction. But since the correction of those views or suggestions is accomplished by getting into the work itself, then why not begin with the work in the first place? That is why volumes of the Gesamtausgabe of Heidegger's works are not supplemented with an introduction or brief commentary. Instead, the reader should face the work in the freedom in which the work comes forth as a work of thinking. This freedom is not preserved when the work is considered to be a riddle whose basic solutions are expected to be found in a brief commentary or introduction.
The text of Hegels Phiinomenologie des Geistes appears without an introduction or brief commentary, because nothing should stand between this work and its readers, who attentively participate in the work of thinking therein. This present text needs not to have such a commentary or introduction, because the character of this text-as a reading that participates in the movement of the work of thinking that is opened up for us in the textwork-demonstrates above all else the inappropriateness of such an introduction.
There is no question that, when an introduction is added to a work, a specific way of reading the work is suggested. But this specific way of reading the work is not the only way to read the work.
When Derrida supplements his translation of this work with an introduction and commentary. Whatever the merits of Derrida's commentary-and these merits are certainly there-there is no doubt that his introduction and his comments stand between the reader and Husserl's work.
By contrast, we can say: The absence of an introduction in the original edition of Hegels Phiinomenologie des Geistes safeguards the independence of the work of thinking as it occurs in the space of freedom that is necessary for the flourishing of the work itself. The Tension of TTanslation. The work character of the work of thinking. In both Hegel and Heidegger, this language takes on a unique character.
In order to say what needs to be said, both Hegel and Heidegger speak a rigorous and precise language that goes beyond the traditional language of philosophy.
In this new territory that language traverses, as it is molded in the works of Hegel and Heidegger, thinking itself enters new territories. It is easy to accuse both Hegel and Heidegger of taking inappropriate measures with language, of wanting to be deliberately abstruse, obscure, and unclear. This accusation comes from the reluctance to recognize that in both phi- Translators' Foreword xiii losophers language manifests new territories of thinking.
If we grasp the urgency of what these philosophers want to think, then we realize that they cannot say what they think without saying it in their own way.
But precisely this demand that the work of thinking places on both Hegel and Heidegger, as language was molded in their thinking, sometimes leads to virtually insurmountable difficulties for the translator. The difficulties in translating Hegel and Heidegger arise mainly in pointing, in anotheT language, to the territories that these thinkers have opened up. It goes without saying that there is no general rule or universal method for doing this.
Beyond bending and twisting the existing resources of a language, in order to let it fit the needs of what is being translated, we as translators are mindful of the realms or territories that this work opens up.
The desire to deal as adequately as possible with these difficulties prompted us to work closely with the French translation of this volume, by Emmanuel Martineau. Aware of these difficulties and with an eye or ear toward letting those difficulties resonate for the reader of this English translation, we offer here the following reflections on significant tensions that arose in our work of translation and how we have chosen to resolve them: As already mentioned, the phrase "die Phiinomenologie des Geistes" appears in the German edition without italics.
Sometimes it refers to Hegel's text and is a title; and sometimes it refers to the process or movement of the thinking that is underway: In each case we have tried to determine which sense of the phrase was operative. In this translation, Phenomenology of Spirit in italics and capitalized refers, obviously, to the Hegel text, whereas the phrase "the phenomenology of spirit" without italics, in lower case, and without quotation marks refers to that movement in thinking that is the work of the phenomenology of spirit.
The same problem, distinction, and solution apply to the Logie-Hegel's text-and to "logic"-the movement of logic in the work of thinking. We are aware that there is interpretation involved in this procedure and, moreover, that we are thereby making a distinction that the German edition-and perhaps even Heidegger himself-did not or did not need to make.
Does the work of thinking that we the readers participate in suffer more with the distinction or without it? In consultation with the French translation, we have occasionally changed the paragraph divisions in order to make possible a smoother and more readable text.
The use of italics in the translation varies from that in the German edition. Italics in Heidegger's original text serve to emphasize certain things within the context of oral delivery and are less appropriate for the written text. Moreover, italics are part of the language and should be used according xiv Translators' Foreword to peculiarities of the particular language.
Thus, our italics are not always those that appear in Heidegger's text. We found that at times we could not wisely carry the italics over into our English rendition.
On the other hand, we found that at times the English requires italics when the German does not. Thus, in some instances our use of italics varies from the original German, based on our understanding that the use of italics is not just a technical aspect that exists independently of the specific language being used, but is part and parcel of the language itself, one of its gestures.
We used A. Miller's translation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, while making emendations to that translation. At times we found it necessary to deviate from the English Hegel terminology-e.
Given these various issues in general and within that context, we offer the following reflections on significant tensions within individual words: There is no English equivalent for this word. It is, of course, not really a German word either. The term absolvent is crucial for the work that Heidegger does with Hegel's text. Thus, we kept the word in our translation, without ignoring entirely the possibilities offered by such English words as "detachment" or "the act of detaching.
Absolvent knowing, for example, carries with it at all times several connotations: Throughout this translation, we have translated aufzeigen as "showing up"-and not, as is commonly done, as "pointing out. A common word in German, dieses is used in Hegel's text to indicate that he wants to think something which is not yet thought in traditional ways of thinking about a thing. When Hegel says "dieses," he wants to think a thing as it is on its way to becoming an object for consciousness.
When Heidegger uses the words "diesig" or "das Diesige," he is reconsidering this same process and finds that to be "dieses" a thing must have the character of a dieses, must be diesig. Only thus can a thing be on its way to becoming an object for consciousness. Thus, we have translated diesig as "having the character of a this.
English has two possibilities: The nuance of each of these words in English is perhaps more a matter of style than of 1rrarudators' Jrore1Vord XV anything else. We have translated einzeln consistently as "particular," even though we are aware that a case can be made for the appropriateness of the word individual in some instances. It is our judgment that Hegel uses this word in two senses: First, meinen and das Meinen can sometimes be translated into English as "meaning," but more often as "intending.
Second, the connection that these words have in their German rootedness is impossible to maintain in English translation. The reader simply needs to remember that the words are rooted together in German.
This is a crucial technical term for Hegel. It presented us with a special difficulty, in that the most readable English translation-"middle term"-carries with it a possibly misleading nuance. We might have chosen "middle," "midpoint," or "mid-point. We hope that translating rein as "sheer" rather than "pure" will allow us to get closer to what Hegel has in mind.
It seems to us that the English word sheer better reflects the absolute character of the process which Hegel has in mind. These words are usually translated as "perceiving" and "perception" respectively. We have also done that. This meaning is implied in the English word perception, but it is not explicit.
Wahr-nehmen as "taking-for-true" is of central philosophical concern for Hegel as well as for Heidegger reading Hegel. This term in Hegel refers at times to the process of knowing and at times to knowledge itself.
Thus, we have translated wissen sometimes as "knowing" and sometimes as "knowledge. We have translated the German word die Erkenntnis as "cognition," precisely to reserve the English words knowing and knowledge for wissen. We found that Heidegger's word zugrundegehen is as xvi Translaton' Foreword diverse as Hegel's aufheben. Thus, we have translated it variously as "running aground," "going under," and ''being annihilated.
All additions to the German text by the translators are within square brackets [ ], including information that was added in the footnotes. Significant and problematical German words that we chose to carry along in the body of the text are also in square brackets. Footnotes from the German edition are at the bottom of the page and are numbered consecutively from the beginning of each major section-following the German text.
Translators' footnotes are at the bottom of the page, in brackets, and are designated by asterisks. Footnotes designated by asterisks without brackets contain information that appears in the text itself in the German edition. The numbers in the running heads refer to the pagination of the German edition. References to Hegel Texts. In an attempt to clarify which texts by Hegel and which editions are being referred to in Heidegger's text and to make proper and adequate reference to English translations of these Hegel texts, we have proceeded in the following way in all footnote references: We have reproduced the references that appear in the German edition as they appear there.
When there is simply a Roman numeral and page number, it refers to the volumes of Hegel's Gesamtawgabe of ff. The later and more accessible Jubiliiumsawgabe reproduces in its margins the volume and page number of the edition.
For Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, abbreviations in the footnote references mean as follows: Felix Meiner Verlag, Hoff. Phiinomenologie des Geistes, hrsg. Felix Meiner Verlag, E. Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Miller Oxford: Besides the Pherwmenology of Spirit, the English translations of two other Hegel texts are referred to in the footnotes simply as "E. Surber Atascadero, Calif.: Miller Atlantic Highlands, N.
All other references to English translations appear in brackets in the respective footnotes. This translation owes an immeasurable amount to the generous help that it has received from Robert Bernasconi, both in terms of the preparation of references to the various editions of Hegel's works and in terms of a careful and concern-filled reading of our text.
We express our deepest gratitude to him, even as we assume full and final responsibility for this work of translation. We also thank John Sallis for his careful reading of the text of this translation.
We are grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities for partial support of this project. Parvis Emad Kenneth Maly Notes 1. Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, , pp.
Hegel's Concept of Experience New York: Harper and Row, Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe. Band 9 Frankfurt: Heidegger focuses on these sections because it is precisely in them that the further development and overcoming of Kant's position in the Critique of Pure Reason take place. Collingwood makes some interesting remarks on the fundamental inadequacy of merely reading a text, in his Autobiography Oxford: Oxford University Press, , pp. Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, , pp.
Martin Heidegger, Lettre a J. Palmier , in M. Haar ed. Cahier de! Martin Heidegger, La "Phinominologie de l'esprit" de Hegel, trans. Martineau Paris: Editions Gallimard, By discussing the title of this work in its various versions, we shall provide ourselves with a necessarily preliminary understanding of the work.
Then, bypassing the lengthy preface and introduction, we shall begin with the interpretation at that place where the matter itself begins.
Phenomenology of Spirit, the current title of the work, is certainly not the original title. It became the definitive title for the work only after it was used in the complete edition of Hegel's works, published by his friends from onward, following immediately after his death. Phenomenology of Spirit is the second volume of the Complete Works and was published in Johannes Schulze, the editor, reports in his foreword that at the time of his sudden death, Hegel was himself preparing a new edition.
For what purpose and in what manner this was a new edition can be gleaned from that foreword. Part One, The Phenomenology of Spirit. The work is thereby given a principal and comprehensive title: System of Science. The Phenomenology is attached to this system and ordered under it. Thus, the content of the work can be grasped only by considering this inner task, which-on the surface-consisted in being the first item in and for the system.
Hegel"s philosophical works will be cited by volume and page number from the Complete Edition of ff.. In its reissue as the Jubilee Edition. The ayatem of the phenomenology and of the encyclopedia To what extent does the system of science require the Phenomenology of Spirit as its first part? What does this subtitle mean? Before we answer this question, we must recall that this subtitle, which later became the only title of the work, is not the complete title.
Rather, the complete title of the work initially read: System of Science: Part One, Science of the Experience of Consciowness.
The subtitle Science of the Experience of Consciowness was then turned into Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit, out of which grew the abbreviated and familiar title Phenomenology of Spirit.
In discussing the title, we must obviously stay with the most complete version of it, which appeared in two forms, both of which say the same thing in different ways. From the most complete title, it can be inferred that the first part of the system of science is itself science: But aside from this first part, no other part of the system of science ever appeared.
However, soon after the appearance of the Phenomenology of Spirit in , Hegel began publishing a work known as the Logic. But the Logic did not appear as the second part of the system of science. Or is this Logic, in accord with the matter at issue therein, the remaining second part of the system? Yes and no. Yes, insofar as the complete title of the Logic also indicates a connection with the System of Science.
The actual title of this work reads: Science of Logic-unusual and strange, for us as well as for Hegel's time.
SOLOMON, Robert. In the Spirit of Hegel.pdf
But this title loses its strangeness when we recall the complete subtitle of the jiTst part: Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The system of the science is thus 1. That is to say: Thus, the system appears necessarily in two shapes.
Inasmuch as they mutually support each other and are interconnected, the Logic and the Phenomenology together form the entirety of the system in the fullness of its actuality. In addition to and apart from the inner, essential relation which the Phenomenology has to the Logic, Hegel refers explicitly to the Logic in many passages of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Z, 33, , 54; E. However, the second part was to contain not only the logic, but the logic together with the concrete sciences of philosophy.
The entirety of what should be the second part of the system is nothing other than the transformed concept of traditional metaphysics, whose systematic content likewise thoroughly determined the Kantian inquiry: Metaphysica generalis ontology and Metaphysica specialis speculative psychology, speculative cosmology, and speculative theology.
This second part, which was to follow, would have contained the entirety of general and special metaphysics, that is, traditional metaphysics-transformed, of course, to fit Hegel's basic position. That transformation can be briefly characterized as follows. Hegel divides the entirety of general and special metaphysics into two parts: However, he divides the philosophy of the concrete into philosophy of nature cosmology and philosophy of spirit psychology. Speculative theology the third part of special metaphysics and for traditional philosophy the decisive part is missing from the philosophy of the concrete, but not from Hegel's metaphysics, where we find speculative theology in an original unity with ontology.
This unity of speculative theology and ontology is the proper concept of Hegelian logic. Speculative theology is not the same as philosophy of religion, nor is it identical with theology in the sense of dogmatics.
Rather, speculative theology is the ontology of the ens Tealissimum, the highest actuality as such. For Hegel this is inseparable from the question of the being of beings. Why this is the case should become clear in the course of the interpretation. However, if the second part of the system that Hegel planned was to represent metaphysics, then the first part of the system, the Phenomenology of Spirit, was to be the foundation of metaphysics, its grounding.
But this grounding is not an epistemology which was as foreign to Hegel as it was to Kant , nor does it involve empty reflections on method prior to its actual implementation in the work.
It is, rather, the preparation of the basis, the "demonstration of the truth of the standpoint,"5 which metaphysics occupies. Hegel says: It will later be followed by a treatment of the two concrete philosophical sciences mentioned. By no means. Precisely when the system is given a larger plan, it becomes more necessary to identify all the detailed parts in their relation to the system. It would not have been contrary to the original or to the enlarged plan of the system if its entirety had been arranged something like this: Science of Logic; Second Sequel: Science of the Philosophy of the Concrete.
Because between and , a transformation was already underway. The sign of the initial transformation in the idea of the system can be seen in the fact that the Logic not only loses the main heading but also stands separately, by itself-not because it turned out to be too detailed, but because the Phenomenology is to take on a different function and position in the fluctuating arrangement of the system.
Because the Phenomenology is no longer the first part of the system, the Logic is no longer its second part. The Logic was separated in order to remain free to assume another place in another arrangement of the system which was then unfolding. We gain an insight into the time between the appearance of the Phenomenology in and the publication of the first volume of the Logic in and the second volume in if we bear in mind, if only in a rough manner, Hegel's "Philosophical Propaedeutic.
Hegel indeed became a university lecturer in But his salary was so insufficient that he did not need the catastrophe which happened in Prussia in to persuade him to seek support for himself in a different manner and elsewhere.
As early as he applied without success for a professorship in Heidelberg. It was in Bavaria-which was where many others, including Schelling, had moved-that Hegel found employment as the editor of a 6. Ill, Sf. GW XXI. Logica et Metaphysica secundum librum nundinis instantibw proditorum to appear at the annual fair. This reference appears in the text itself in the German edition. The word nundinis appears erroneously as mundinis in the German text.
This was brought to the translators' attention by f. In he was able to exchange this position for a more appropriate one as headmaster of the secondary school in Niimberg, where he stayed until , when the second part of the Logic appeared and the call to Heidelberg University came.
That conclusion reads as follows: We elders, who have grown to adulthood in the storms of the age, consider you fortunate, because your youth falls in these times in which you may devote yourselves to science and truth with less curtailment. I have dedicated my life to science; and it is a true joy for me to find myself again in this place where I may work to a greater degree with others and with a wider effectiveness, in the interests of the higher sciences, and help to direct your way therein.
I hope that I may succeed in earning and gaining your confidence. But at first I wish to make a single request: The love of truth, faith in the power of spirit, is the first condition for philosophy. Man, because he is spirit, may and should deem himself worthy of the highest; he cannot think too highly of the greatness and the power of his spirit; and with this faith, nothing will be so difficult and hard that it will not reveal itself to him.
The essence of the universe, at first hidden and concealed, has no power to offer resistance to the courageous search for knowledge; it must open itself up before the seeker, set its riches and its depths before his eyes to give him pleasure. What prompted Hegel to accept the call this time was certainly not the prospect of getting involved in all the sundry activities of a professor of philosophy, but exactly the opposite.
The system was established. On October 22, , Hegel began his lectureship in Berlin. And he remained professor of philosophy to the end of his life, thirteen years later in XIII, 3. Haldane and F. Simon, I. Hegel und seine Zeit [Berlin: Verlag von Rudolph Gaertner. In his lectures, Hegel worked out the system which was given its decisive and final form in in the Heidelberg Encyclopedia. According to their volume, the lectures of the Berlin period constitute the major part of Hegel's complete works.
As Tsaid earlier, it is through Hegel's "Philosophical Propaedeutic" as presented to the senior classes of the secondary school that we gain an insight into the work of Hegel between and It was not published by Hegel himself.
In , seven years after the philosopher's death, Karl Rosenkranz, one of his students, found the manuscript among Hegel's literary remains, as he was passing through Berlin. Philosophy instruction at the secondary school was divided into three courses. The first course was for the lower grade and included instructions in law, morality. The second course was for the middle grade and was made up of phenomenology of spirit and logic.
The last course was for the upper grade and was made up of logic in the sense of the Doctrine of the Concept [Begriffslehre] and the philosophical encyclopedia. It is important to note that logic appears here in two different places. In the second course logic follows phenomenology, which is in keeping with the plan of the system in which the Phenomenology belongs and for which it was written.
In the last course, however, logic is the foundation for the philosophical encyclopedia, precedes everything else, and is followed by the science of nature and science of spirit.
Then in , while in Heidelberg, Hegel elaborated further on the encyclopedia, in which logic is now the first significant part, and published it under the title Encyclopedia der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse [The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline].
This Encyclopedia presents the new and final form of the System, having three parts: Science of logic B. Philosophy of nature C. Philosophy of spirit.
Thus, following what we have said so far, the encyclopedia contains the whole of metaphysics. But then what became of phenomenology? It became a segment of a segment of the third part of the system, namely. This is again divided into three parts: Subjective spirit 2. Objective spirit 3.
Absolute spirit. In the last years of his life, around , Hegel had to prepare a new edition of both the Phenomenology of Spirit, which had been out of print for a long time, and the Logic. While preparing the second edition of the Logic in , and while editing the preface to the first edition, Hegel added a footnote to the passage mentioned above, where he speaks about the external relationship of the Phenomenology the first part of the system to the Logic.
In place of the projected second part, mentioned here, which was to contain all the other philosophical sciences, I have since brought out the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, the third edition of which appeared last year.
What does it mean to say that the encyclopedia has taken the place of the second part of the system as projected from the vantage point of the phenomenology? However accurate this may be, it does not truly reflect the facts pertaining to the new form of the system. It is correct to say that the encyclopedia corresponds to the second part of the system and was planned to follow the phenomenology as the first part.
However, the encyclopedia functions neither as the second part of the old system, nor as part of the new system.
Rather, the encyclopedia presents the whole of the new system. It recognizes the phenomenology neither as an independent nor as a foundational part of the system, but only as a segment of a segment of the third part.
Therefore, we shall from now on call the system which has two parts and is defined in terms of the phenomenology, but is not exhausted by it, simply the phenomenologysystem. We shall distinguish this system from that presented in the encyclopedia, which we shall call the encyclopedia-system. In each case logic takes a different position and fulfills a different function.
The following diagram offers a representation of what has been said so far: But this transformation is not a rejection of the previous standpoint as untenable, which is the judgment that the professional pen-pushers like to record in their history of philosophy. Rather, it is the transformation of the system enforced by the initial realization of the phenomenology-system.
Listen to the entire book here:
It is thus that the Phenomenology of Spirit itself comes to be regarded as superfluous. If we do not differentiate both systems as first and second, it is because another system, the so-called Jena-system, precedes the phenomenologysystem.
This is, of course, only a general designation. The various indications are that it was precisely in the Jena period that the specifically Hegelian idea of system matured; and accordingly the drafts took many forms. Although the sources are still insufficient, there is reason to believe that already prior to his Jena period in Frankfurt, Hegel projected his entire philosophy-the system.
Spirit pro- vides the cultural and historical background that enables one to be who one is. These two concluding sub-sections are important, therefore, because they repre- sent the moment when individual reason becomes moral.
Hoy contends that Hegel does not simply shift his narrative from the I to the We. Instead, he develops a stronger argument that there is no I without a We.
Thus Hegel does not simply jump from Reason to Spirit; he provides an interpretive explanation of the transition from individual Reason to collective Spirit. Hoy focuses on the appearance of Spirit in the world of ancient Greece. This stage corresponds to the relation between the Enlightenment and Faith in the Phenomenology.
Hence the struggle of the Enlightenment with Faith is an unwitting struggle with itself. The Enlightenment focuses on its relation to spatio-temporal objects, though its individualism occludes how its rela- tions to objects are a function of its collective, cultural self-understanding. Faith focuses on its relation to God within a religious community, while neglecting that these relations are functions of how it relates to spatio-temporal objects.
Neither side correctly or fully understands the self-relations involved in relating to objects, nor the relations to objects involved in relating to oneself. Hence neither side can properly account for itself nor justify its claims and actions. These failings appear dramatically in the moral and political counter-part to Enlightenment deism, the French Reign of Terror.
Hegel aims to show that this extreme must be integrated properly with the universality and substantiality of spirit. Central to the moral worldview is the division between and the dominance of morality over nature. Morality is thus both independent of nature but also dependent upon it as a source of obligations and as its context of moral action. However, human agents cannot renounce their claim to happiness, though happiness requires the cooperation of nature.
This tension generates a series of contradictions within the Kantian account introduction xxiii of moral agency, which generates a series of forms of dissemblance, none of which can resolve or occlude the original contradiction. It purports to avoid the problems of the moral worldview by revising its universality requirement, thus integrating pure duty with moral action.
However, claiming to identify what is universally right to do in any situation on the basis of individual conviction is impossible, because particular circumstances defy the simplicity of conscience and because agents have different convictions about what is right to do on that occasion. This presumed moral superiority requires withdrawing from the world of moral action in order to live by its demands for honesty, openness, and authenticity.
Yet, even if the beautiful soul withdraws into a tiny community with carefully chosen companions, living with other people drives it to hypocrisy, thus thwarting its own principles. Hegel maintains for logical reasons that this speculative feature is present, though only implicitly, in all modes of knowing. She points out the originally Aristotelian metaphysical foundation for this claim, namely the necessary logical sameness Gleichheit of thought and its content.
The phenomenology of mind
She then presents this dynamic concep- tion of spirit as a process of simultaneous expansion and inwardization through space and time.Here we are dealing with the science and its system. Thus, we have translated it variously as "running aground," "going under," and ''being annihilated. At times we found it necessary to deviate from the English Hegel terminology-e. Rather, the appearance in such and such a way [das So-Scheinen] belongs precisely to that which is experienced and is included in that which renders the experience richer.
Experiencing [in Erfahrung bringen means to pursue the matter itself in a certain way and to see whether what has been said or believed can be confirmed. XIII, 3. There Hegel speaks of "what at the present time constitutes the primary interest of philosophy, namely, to place God absolutely at the beginning once again on the pinnacle of philosophy as the sole ground of everything, as the only principium essendi and cognoscendi, after he has been placed long enough alongside other finite things, or after he has been put right at the end as a postulate which proceeds from an absolute finitude.